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recent resurgence of interest in Hobbes in philosophy, political science, and his-
tory, they say, “there is surprisingly little engagement with Hobbes as a jurist or
legal thinker.” This is despite the fact that “there has been a turn in legal schol-
arship towards political theory in a way that engages recognizably Hobbesian
themes, for example: the law and politics of security; the law and politics of fear;
and the relationship between security and liberty. It might even be the case that
the scholarly surge and the turn to Hobbesian themes are connected in that
Hobbes’s focus on security and order as foundational values of civilized society
seems particularly apt in unsettled times” ð1Þ. However, the essays never return to
contemporary discussions of familiar Hobbesian themes. In fact, there is perhaps
a surprising lack of attention to some topics onemight expect to see; for example,
there is no essay devoted to international relations or international law, and there
is only scarce mention of these topics within the essays.
What bearing might these essays have on contemporary legal scholarship?
The first three essays and the last one help to set the historical record straight ðor
at least complicate received wisdomÞ. The middle six essays explore the potential
inherent in Hobbes’s work, contributing to a more interesting view for contem-
porary legal scholars to address. While I’m sympathetic to the project of reimag-
ining Hobbes in a more liberal light, however, some questions remain: What is
the purpose of retooling Hobbes in this way? That is, what do we want from a
kinder, gentler Hobbes? If the interest is in showing how a Hobbesian framework
could enrich contemporary legal scholarship, the reader will likely come away a
bit disappointed since there is little direct engagement with this scholarship. If,
however, the goal is to show the enduring interest and importance of Hobbes for
our general understanding of law and the limits of political authority, then this
collection succeeds admirably. Hobbes and the Law is an important contribution
to Hobbes studies and is to be roundly recommended.
Susanne Sreedhar
Boston University
Gardner, John. Law as a Leap of Faith.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 314. $68.00 ðclothÞ; $30.00 ðpaperÞ;
$45.49 ðebookÞ.
John Gardner holds the chair of jurisprudence at Oxford, having followed
H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin into the position. As such, he is perhaps
uniquely positioned to garner attention for his pronouncements about the na-
ture and operation of law in general. This book is a collection of papers mostly
previously published and delivered on topics relating to general jurisprudence.
Two chapters, “The Supposed Formality of the Rule of Law” and “Law in Gen-
eral,” have not previously been published. Gardner explicitly disavows any overt
intent to advance a novel theory here, saying instead that many of the papers
were conceived as a way to correct misconceptions on the part of students ðviÞ.
The first essay, bearing the same title as the book, might at first blush appear
to be out of place in that it begins with a treatment of the Euthyphro problem:
Does God love the good because it is good ðin which case God seems to be ir-
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relevant to what we should doÞ, or is what God loves good merely because he
loves it? Gardner sees the Euthyphro problem as mirroring the debate between
natural law and legal positivism, with the former holding that the law is posited
because it is binding and the latter that it is binding because it is posited. While
he acknowledges that there are several ways in which the analogy doesn’t hold,
what seems significant about this particular paper for the general jurisprudent is
the effect on legal normativity and validity of what is elsewhere called the internal
and ðengagedÞ external perspectives. Joseph Raz, for example, has noted that
one can deploy norms in speaking from the point of view of the listener without
endorsing those norms oneself ðPractical Reason and Norms ½London: Hutch-
inson, 1975, 175–76Þ. Musing on the Euthyphro problem leads Gardner to con-
sider the impact those different perspectives on normativity have on legal va-
lidity. If all and only legally valid norms have normative force within a legal system
and if legal validity is an entirely factual matter of conformity with a basic validity
rule, then it is hard to see how legal validity can confer robust normativity. How
can mere facts create norms or confer normativity on an artificial set of rules?
But if the system’s merit is presupposed when seen from inside, the insider can
see an ultimate normative source that the theorist is not in a position to endorse.
The problem of legal normativity then becomes merely a problem of perspec-
tive—it is the theorist’s lack of engagement that leads her to see a problem where
the participant sees none.
“Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths” delves into misinterpretations of the sources
thesis, the positivist idea that legal validity depends only on whether a given pu-
tative legal norm comes from the right place and was made in the right way, and
not on the merits of the norm. Since legal positivism is the dominant view among
analytic legal philosophers, those who have some interest in the theory or what
theorists have to say on the subject on legal validity, but who are not themselves
in that camp, would do well to consult this paper to avoid misinterpretations.
Those already steeped in the literature will not find the ball advanced signifi-
cantly by this paper, as it is aimedmore at outsiders and students. Gardner points
out ð21Þ that the sources thesis does not preclude seeing the merits of the norm
as causally relevant to its adoption; a legislator may be attempting to approxi-
mate a moral norm in fashioning a given law. However, for a positivist, that causal
relevance has no necessary impact on the legal validity of the norm. As to the
reasons for the misinterpretations of legal positivism, Gardner has two diagno-
ses. The first is that the sources thesis does not provide any practical guidance
as to what someone seeking to understand the law of a particular community
might say on a given matter. This is misunderstood by those who think that le-
gal philosophy must have practical implications about what the state of the law is
or what it should be saying on a particular subject. The other diagnosis is that
legal practitioners are used to thinking of norms in terms of their sources since
they are trained to search for an authority behind any normative claim. They see
the sources thesis as trivial and search for something else that legal positivism
must be saying.
“Some Types of Law” explores the various ways in which laws are made, in
order to undermine the argument that some laws are not made by agents and
hence “are not artefacts” ð54Þ. ðIf the reader will forgive the shameless self-
promotion, the claim that laws are artifacts is a main one I defend in an up-
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coming book from the same publisher.Þ The first kind of lawmaking is legisla-
tion. Three features distinguish it from other kinds of lawmaking: the fact that it
is expressly made, the fact that it is intentionally made, and the fact that it is
made by one agent ðwhich includes a univocal bodyÞ. The second kind of law-
making is customary law, which is neither expressly nor intentionally made, nor
is it made by a unitary agent ðbut rather by manyÞ. This kind includes Hart’s rule
of recognition ðthe basic rule determining legal validityÞ. A third kind of law-
making is case law, which is not expressly made in that the legal norms are made
by being deployed in argument rather than openly declared; it may or may
not be intentionally made ðin that judges may be unaware of how their new legal
norms change or conflict with previous onesÞ, but it is made by one agent.
The central question of “Can There Be a Written Constitution?” hinges on
the recognition that what serves as the constitution of a given legal jurisdiction
is what is “received by its official users” ð97Þ. Hence the canonical written form
of any document may be immaterial to its use as a constitution, which is simply
the set of rules used to determine the institutions and offices of government. To
borrow from Hart, the idea is that the ultimate validity rules cannot themselves
be legislated since we would then need a superior rule to tell us to recognize that
piece of legislation ðmeaning the legislated rule is not, in the end, ultimateÞ. But
if the constitution is supposed to be this ultimate set of rules, then a canonical
written form might seem to have the same problem. Gardner argues they can be
written for the following reasons: First, ultimate validity rules confer a duty on
law-applying officials to conform their decisions to what is to be recognized as law
under those ultimate validity rules. But written constitutions can still allocate
legal powers to the system’s highest legal bodies ðrules of change and adjudica-
tion in Hart’s terminologyÞ. Second, the ultimate rules of validity are not them-
selves fully understood as legal rules ðsince they are constitutive of validity for
legal rules, they do not share in all the properties of legal rulesÞ. Hence the ul-
timate rules of validity are not the constitution but lie beyond it. So there’s no
problem with having a written constitution. Finally, the argument against written
constitutions assumed that the highest legislative and interpretive bodies were
themselves creations of constitutional custom. But if it is conceptually possible
for the powers of these highest bodies to be themselves endowed by an originally
still higher institution ðe.g., a monarch or constitutional conventionÞ, yet not revo-
cable ðperhaps because the higher institution thereupon ceases to existÞ, then space
is opened for a written canonical instrument that records that endowment.
“How Law Claims, What Law Claims” defends Raz’s and Robert Alexy’s idea
that law makes claims against critics who say a nonperson cannot make claims.
Gardner follows Raz’s more recent elaborations that the claims law makes are
made by its officials on behalf of law ðwhich is one reason it doesn’t have to be
made by officials genuinely believing those claims; 131Þ. I am left wondering
about Raz’s earlier point that the law must be making claims independently of
officials in order to account for the possibility of customary law ðwhich may lack
officialsÞ making them ð Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law ½Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1979, 29Þ. Perhaps Gardner would respond that customary law
makes its claims through nonofficials; it is generally a more widely distributed
social pressure reinforcing customary legal norms. As against the Hartian view
that legal obligations are sui generis ðalthough he does not mention Hart in this
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contextÞ, Gardner notes that a legal obligation which does not even purport to
be a moral obligation would not be falsifiable since it would be a legal fiat.
Hence, the idea that law makes claims upon us entails that legal rights and re-
sponsibilities are claims of moral rights and responsibilities. This is a provocative
idea but also risks giving ammunition to those who would combine a denial of
law’s power to claim with a denial of any possibility of legitimate practical author-
ity for law.
“Nearly Natural Law” is an important paper for setting out the similarities
and remaining differences between natural law and legal positivism. Recent de-
cades have seen a rapprochement of sorts, with modern natural lawyers com-
plaining ðrightfullyÞ that many legal positivists have long mischaracterized the
more sophisticated versions of their view. Modern thinkers like John Finnis and
Mark Murphy are clear in saying that an unjust ðor irrationalÞ law is a defective
law, rather than one that somehow voids its membership in the class of law
ðFinnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights ½Oxford: Clarendon, 1980; Murphy, Nat-
ural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics ½Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006Þ. This may leave the difference between natural law and legal positivism to
seem like a quibble: Is an unjust ðor irrationalÞ law legally defective ði.e., defec-
tive qua law; 164Þ or merely morally defective? Gardner takes even this quibble
away; law has moral objectives, and hence an unjust law is legally defective. Yet
there is still important space between the two theories, captured by the distinc-
tion between what it is to say ðfollowing HartÞ that the law is “defeasibly morally
obligatory” and ðfollowing FinnisÞ that it is “presumptively” morally obligatory
ð171–72Þ. The former is a conceptual claim about law, saying merely that the
central case is the successful case. It has no further implications about how often
that central case will be seen or whether people should be acting on the as-
sumption that any instance of law they encounter will be a successful case. The
latter takes an extra step that we ought to treat law as morally binding unless and
until we have reason to do otherwise. While Gardner doesn’t, we can take this
realization one step further by saying that the mistake Finnis makes with his
stronger claim is a slight reversion to seeing success as a membership condition
in the class of law ða position he and Murphy explicitly rejectÞ. To argue from the
central case of success to the presumption of success is to say that we can pre-
sume that any member of the class of law is fulfilling its moral purpose. Themain
motivation for that is the ðmistakenÞ Aristotelian view that something under-
stood in terms of its function must be successfully performing that function in
order to be a member of the class. Against this, Gardner has elsewhere pointed
out that for something to have a function, it must be capable of failure ð“Law’s
Aims in Law’s Empire,” in Exploring Law’s Empire, ed. Scott Hershovitz ½Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006, 207–24, at 216Þ.
In “The Legality of Law” Gardner begins by noting a methodological ad-
vance Hart made over John Austin and Hans Kelsen, who thought the best place
to start an inquiry into the nature of law is to understand what makes something
a law and then to generalize. Hart realized that laws come in systems of norms
and that some of those norms might not be laws. Hence it makes sense to start
with legal systems rather than individual laws. They agreed that law is a genre of
artifacts ðand that laws are artifacts; 180Þ. But that does not entitle us to conclude
that everything belonging to the genre is itself an artifact; a legal system is not
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merely a collection of artifacts and yet still belongs to the genre ð181Þ. This leads
to the conclusion ðoffered against Dworkin but valuable on its ownÞ that there
are at least two ways a given artifact can fail to be a legal norm: either it is not the
right kind of artifact to count as a legal norm or it simply fails to conform to the
validity criteria of any extant legal system. Gardner then reminds us of the dis-
tinction between seeing law as a genre of artifacts and as a practice, an ambiguity
in law that is common in other practices which also produce artifacts ðlike artistic
endeavorsÞ. The practice of law goes beyond the artifacts of law in that the prac-
tice involves the use of nonlegal norms ðboth in application and in making legal
argumentsÞ and in that legal practitioners are bound by role-related moral norms
that are not themselves legal but regulate their legal work ð190Þ.
“The Supposed Formality of the Rule of Law” begins with a defense of Lon
Fuller’s conception of the rule of law against critics who accuse him of ‘legalism’.
Fuller’s view is not legalistic, as he admits that the “inner morality of law” is only
one part of the ideal we have for law, the other being that it conforms to “ex-
ternal morality.” Another criticism is that it is formalist, a notion that Fuller
seems to endorse but not in the way that the critics understand it. It does not
emphasize “form” in the sense opposed to “content”; Fuller’s criteria do ground
judgments about the content of laws ðe.g., that the law not demand the impos-
sibleÞ. It is not formalist in the “procedural” sense as opposed to “substantive”
since Fuller’s criteria function largely independently from questions of legal pro-
cedure, and some may give rise to substantive rights. Instead, Gardner suggests
that Fuller joins Hart and Kelsen in seeing law as what Les Green calls a “modal
kind” ð206; quoting Green, “The Concept of Law Revisited,”Michigan Law Review
94 ½1996: 1687–1717, 1709Þ. To say it is a modal kind is to say that it is distin-
guished by the way it pursues its purposes rather than what those purposes are.
For Gardner, this explains why questions about whether Fuller’s conception of
the rule of law is formalistic or legalistic are confused: The inner morality of law
focuses on the operation of law, the means it employs. My problem with that idea
is that what makes the law unique ðdistinctive from other social phenomenaÞ is
neither its functions nor its modality ðconsider how many other normative social
systems employ authoritatively posited and interpreted rulesÞ but rather the in-
stitutionalization of otherwise nonunique means to nonunique ends. As an in-
stitutional kind, what individuates it is its uniqueness as a formal institution for
the generation of other formal institutions, codifying and setting forth the cri-
teria for what John Searle calls the “deontic powers” associated with the special
statuses it confers through posited norms ðMaking the Social World ½Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2010, 8–9Þ.
“Hart on Legality, Justice, and Morality” reiterates that it is a mistake to say
that Hart believed in no necessary connection between law and morality. Gard-
ner notes Hart’s distaste for the usual notion of legality as an ideal for law, wor-
ried as he was that it would lead theorists to think that it was an ideal to which law
necessarily lives up. ðBoth Fuller and Dworkin are mentioned as committing this
sin.Þ For Hart, having a legal system is necessary but not sufficient for the ideal of
legality. One concession Hart does make to this view is that for law to live up to
its nature as a system of rules, it must be possible for the rules to guide behavior
rather than merely to govern by threats. Gardner diverges from Hart in seeing
that the ideal for law is related to it as a central case ðfollowing Finnis and Raz in
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seeing failures as limit casesÞ, while Hart apparently thought that the ideal func-
tioned as a rival concept of law to that which the positivists expounded upon.
Once this connection between law and legality is established, Gardner elaborates
ðwhile critiquingÞ Hart’s view that the notion of legality as the application of a
general rule contains the “germ . . . of justice” ð232; quoting Hart, The Concept of
Law, 2nd ed. ½Oxford: Clarendon, 1994, 202Þ. While he clearly held that the rule
of law was a component of justice and that justice was central to any moral sys-
tem, Hart had conflicting things to say about whether the rule of law constituted
amorality of law. Emphasizing, as Hart did, that the rule of law is compatible with
great evil, Gardner speculates that the complication comes from Hart’s belief
that the rule of law must be an incomplete ideal for law.
“The Virtue of Justice and the Character of Law” examines the ubiquitous
linkage between law and justice. In order to do this, Gardner embraces a classical
view of morality as being composed of diverse and potentially competing virtues,
of which justice is one. ðA modern view searches for a single overarching virtue,
holding that all moral questions can be rationally commensuratedÞ. Classically,
justice is a virtue of allocation; it focuses on the method of allocation rather than
what is being allocated. The mere fact that law is a system of rules does not yet
then explain why justice is its prime criterion, since rules can be generated and
judged by a number of other moral criteria. Furthermore, the use of justice as
the criterion for law may put pressure on law to be less rule bound in instances in
which following the rule leads to a less just result. Instead, Gardner notes, it is
when the benefits and burdens of rules must be “rationed” that questions of jus-
tice necessarily enter ð256Þ. Mostly, this doesn’t arise in the direct application of
a legal rule by an individual to inform her behavior. But when its application
must be adjudicated among actual or potential disputing parties, it is unavoid-
able. It is therefore in the centrality of adjudication to law that we find the key to
justice’s importance.
The final paper, “Law in General,” also makes its first appearance here.
Gardner defends the methodological claim that we can learn something about
law everywhere it is found, its necessary characteristics. He begins by defeating
Dworkin’s division of jurisprudential issues into the “sociological” ðwhat is a legal
systemÞ and the “doctrinal” ðwhat makes a given legal proposition true in a given
jurisdictionÞ, showing that any answers to the latter must depend on answers
to the former. Hence Dworkin’s dismissal of the former is unfounded ð270–71;
quoting Dworkin, “Hart and the Concepts of Law,” Harvard Law Review Forum,
119 ½2006: 95–104 at 97–98Þ. Gardner then turns to Hart’s oft-quoted claim
that he was doing “descriptive sociology” ð275; quoting Hart, The Concept of Law
½Oxford: Clarendon, 1961, vÞ. While Hart later seemingly embraced the descriptive
part of that characterization at the cost of the sociological, Gardner believes that
it would have been better to have done the opposite. Hart’s project was “classifi-
catory” ðor “conceptual”Þ rather than descriptive or evaluative, providing the the-
oretical groundwork for others to ask the right questions in doing their sociologi-
cal investigations ð276–77; with what I take to be a swipe at Brian Leiter, e.g., “The
Naturalistic Turn in Legal Philosophy,” APA Newsletter on Law and Philosophy, Spring
2001, 142–46, for his Quinian view that conceptual questions can be eliminated
entirelyÞ. Against the view that Hart was misguided in his universalist aspirations
to capture law wherever it may arise, Gardner notes that we must understand
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something about law in general to be able to say anything about law in particu-
lar since we would need to be able to classify particular instances as law ð279Þ.
He replies to those who criticize Hart’s view for being too focused on the nation-
state and missing the developments on the international stage such as the law of
the European Union. It is Hart’s emphasis on the social aspect of law that rep-
resented such an advance over previous theories, and legal sociologists need to
make the same reliance. If anything, Hart is clearer about his notion of the social
basis of law in a customary rule followed by relevant officials since it doesn’t rely
on a controversial conception of society. Hence, there is no problem accom-
modating European Union law within Hart’s theory. Furthermore, Hart has no
problem accommodating customary legal systems, so long as there is a mecha-
nism for identifying law-applying officials. Gardner concludes by defending Hart
against methodological objections that only a functionalist theory can be so-
ciologically useful, that he smuggled into his theory an evaluation that law is
superior to other forms of social arrangement, and that it was not sufficiently
attentive either to noninstitutionalized normative arrangements or to what other
cultures might conceptualize as law.
Kenneth M. Ehrenberg
University of Alabama
Gibbard, Allan. Meaning and Normativity.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 336. $55.00 ðclothÞ.
In this book, Allan Gibbard develops a ‘normativist’ and expressivist account
of meaning, according to which meaning ascriptions concern how we ought to
use language and are explained as complex plans for using language in certain
ways. The book, which is in significant part based on articles that Gibbard has
published on the topic over the past two decades or so, is the clearest and most
thorough examination of this combination of ideas to date. Gibbard does not
much discuss other normativist views or the criticisms of normativism but rather
focuses on outlining his own distinctive approach. A part of the project is to use
expressivist metanormative theory to offer insights into issues in philosophy of
language; another part is to continue developing Gibbard’s influential expres-
sivist metanormative theory through examining the implications for expressivism
of the idea that the concept of meaning would be normative.
The book is rich in original ideas and arguments, and the topics canvassed
or commented on are significant and bewildering in their number: Gibbard of-
fers, for instance, normativist-expressivist explanations of the concepts of synon-
ymy, analytic and a priori equivalence, and reference; a solution to Kripke’s Witt-
genstein’s ‘skeptical paradox’; commentary on Paul Horwich’s use-theoretic view;
an explanation for objective oughts in terms of subjective ones; updates on his
expressivist view; an articulation of the difference between expressivism and non-
naturalist realism in metanormative theory; and a response to Mark Schroeder’s
discussion of the Frege-Geach problem. It is a compact and difficult book, but se-
rious students of the relevant topics should find its study rewarding, and clearly
it is essential reading for anyone working on meaning and normativity.
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